Introduction
This paper examines the issue of the appropriate cost of capital for companies operating in the regulated water industry in the UK. This issue is of importance at the current time because the water regulator, Ofwat, is currently in the final stages of its periodic review of prices to be set for the coming five years, 2000-2004. It is also an issue of some importance and controversy. As we note in the following, there has been a tendency for UK regulators to allow a rather low cost of capital, both in the water sector and in other regulated utility sectors. The basis for this is controversial. In this paper, we argue that the lower estimates of the cost of capital allowed by UK regulators are inappropriate and based on erroneous estimation techniques. While there is some evidence for a decline, reasonable estimates of the cost of capital are, in general, significantly above those allowed by regulators, and in particular above the estimate proposed by Ofwat in its recent consultation process.
In the past, this under-estimate of the cost of capital by regulators may not have been too crucial. This is because its effects on corporate profits were offset by a compensating regulatory error in under-estimating the scope for efficiency gains in the newly privatised utility sectors: thus the X factor (or Ks in the water sector) was underestimated, compensating for a low allowed cost of capital. Thus companies were able to offset any squeeze on profits by greater than expected efficiency gains.
However, looking forward, the consequences of an under-estimate of the cost of capital could well be much more serious. Regulators have learnt the lesson of past underestimates of efficiency gains, and have appreciably increased their estimates of the efficiency gains that are achievable in the future. There is a concern that they may have done this just at the time when the wave of productivity enhancement based on eliminating the inefficiencies associated with public ownership has run its course, so that it will be very difficult to sustain the past trend of productivity enhancement. If this is so, this will provide an additional squeeze on profitability in the water sector. We do not examine this issue in this paper, but merely note that if this is correct then it will compound the consequences of an under-estimate of the cost of capital.
However, the question of the cost of capital is important even if efficiency gains looking forward are correctly estimated, since its under-estimation will lead to a depressed level of profitability in the sector. Of course, a lower cost of capital entails lower prices, and therefore provides immediate benefits to customers. But too a low a level of profits will have damaging effects in the longer run. It will make it difficult for companies to raise new finance for investment, holding back the modernisation of the sector and the enhancement of its service capacity. (The squeeze on investment in the public sector and consequent under-investment and deterioration of service delivery was one of the motivations for privatisation of the publicly owned utilities.) It may force companies to lower the quality of service to try to restore profitability to the level expected by capital markets. And a depressed cost of capital will deter new entrants in those areas where competition might otherwise arise, thereby impeding the rise of competition. Since competition provides a major spur for enterprise and innovation, to the ultimate benefit of customers, this effect is highly detrimental to the long run health of the industry.
The water sector as a whole is engaged in an appreciable programme of investment to enhance the standard of water quality to reach EU-determined targets, and this programme will continue over the five years of the next regulatory period. Thus all of the above concerns about a low cost of capital are relevant to the water sector and the current periodic review. The programme of investment will require substantial new finance to be raised in capital markets: this may be difficult to accomplish if the return allowed by the regulator on capital invested is set too low, and so the investment programme may be jeopardised.
For all these reasons, we think that the concerns raised in this paper are crucial to the future of the UK water sector. They need to be taken seriously by the regulator in the current periodic review.
The plan of the paper is as follows. The following section summarises the broad debate on the cost of capital. Section 3 then focuses on the most important element in this debate, the appropriate market risk premium. Section 4 examines the specific, and somewhat sparse, evidence cited by Ofwat on the equity risk premium. We argue that this evidence can reasonably be interpreted rather differently, yielding an estimate rather higher than that proposed by Ofwat. Section 5 then reviews the broader UK debate on the cost of capital. Section 6 examines the riskiness of the water sector. Section 7 compares estimates of the cost of capital from Ofwat and a 'conventional' approach with the procedure used by the MMC. Both the other procedures give an estimate some 1-1½% higher than that proposed by Ofwat. Section 8 then draws together the principal arguments of the previous sections and underscores the risks articulated above that the current review risks setting too low a cost of capital, to the detriment of the long run performance of the UK water sector. An important point is that even the straight application of the MMC procedure for estimating the cost of capital, which we judge is subject to downward biases, results in a higher estimate of the cost of capital than OFWAT has been proposing in its consultation documents.
Summary of the cost of capital debate
Leading textbooks on corporate finance give similar treatments of the cost of capital. Taking Brealey and Myers (1996) as an example, they advocate calculating the cost of capital as the weighted average of the costs of debt and equity:
Cost of capital = Proportion of debt x After-tax cost of debt + Proportion of equity x Cost of equity This is called the weighted average cost of capital (WACC).
The pre-tax cost of debt is usually estimated by the cost of new borrowing by the company in question. This is then adjusted by the corporate tax rate to give an aftertax rate. The proportion of debt is the proportion by market value of the net debt of the firm. Net debt is measured as long term debt plus short term debt minus cash. The equity value for use in this calculation is the market capitalisation of the equity. The other input required is the cost of equity.
To estimate the cost of equity Brealey and Myers recommend the use of the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). This states that the cost of equity is set by the riskless interest rate plus a premium that is related to the risk of the firm in question. The relevant measure of risk for this purpose is called the beta of the firm's shares. Betas are relative measures of risk, and the beta of the overall stock market is one. The CAPM formula is then:
Cost of equity = Riskless interest rate + Beta x Market risk premium
The riskless interest rate is given by the rate on government debt. Beta estimates can be obtained from services, such as the London Business School Risk Measurement Service (LBSRMS), that estimate them on the basis of historical share price behaviour. The market risk premium that Brealey and Myers advocate is the historical premium obtained from investing in equities rather than short term government debt (treasury bills).
Using average data on the UK water industry gives a proportion of debt of 26% for the seven largest water companies. The average equity beta of these companies reported in the January-March edition of the LBSRMS is 0.72. The nominal five year interest rate is currently 4.8%. The average historical premium of equity returns over the returns on treasury bills has been 9.2%. The current borrowing spread for water companies is about 1.25%. Putting these inputs together gives an estimate of the WACC for a five year horizon of 9.5%, as shown in Table 1 . 
Calculations:
Cost of equity = 4.8% + 0.72 x 9.2% = 11.4% (nominal)
After-tax cost of debt = (4.8% +1.25%) x (1-0.3) = 4.2% (nominal)
Nominal WACC = 0.26 x 4.2% + 0.74 x 11.4% = 9.5% (nominal)
To convert this into a real cost of capital required a forecast of the inflation rate. A market consensus forecast can be obtained from the difference between the yields on nominal gilts and the yields on index-linked gilts. These are currently 4.8% and 2.0% respectively for a five year maturity, giving an inflation forecast of 2.7%. Adjusting the estimate of the nominal cost of capital for this gives a real cost of capital of 6.6%.
We can compare this 'conventional' estimate of the cost of capital with the estimate given in Prospects for Prices (Ofwat, 1998) . The central estimates of the inputs are given in Table 2 . Where these are not explicitly stated by Ofwat, they have been imputed from other numbers given.
The numbers in Table 2 give the calculation for Ofwat's central estimate of the real cost of capital (4.75%). The figure that is then used in further calculations is 5.25%.
We can understand the source of the differences between Ofwat's estimate and the 'conventional' estimate by examining the sources of the difference. These are shown in Table 3 . The final column of the table shows the impact on the estimate of the real WACC of making the Ofwat assumption rather than the 'conventional' assumption. The overall impact is 1.9%, the difference between the conventional estimate of the real cost of capital of 6.6% and the Ofwat estimate of 4.75%. The major source of the difference is the estimate of the market risk premium. This lowers the Ofwat estimate by over 3%. The second most important difference is the riskless interest rate, where the fall in the real interest rate between the date of the Ofwat estimate and the current date has lowered the cost of capital estimate by about three-quarters of one percent.
- 
Cost of equity = 2.75% + 1.28 x 3.25% = 6.9% (real)
After-tax cost of debt = (2.75% +1.38%) x (1-0.3) = 2.9% (real) WACC = 0.54 x 2.9% + 0.46 x 6.9% = 4.75% (real) 
The other differences are smaller than these two major ones. One is, however, worth note. The two estimates assume very different levels of gearing. However, the different levels of gearing assumed in the two estimates make little difference to the overall WACC estimate because the beta has been adjusted to reflect the effect of increased gearing in the Ofwat estimate. If this were not the case and the beta of 0.72 appropriate to the lower level of gearing were used in conjunction with the high level of gearing assumed by Ofwat, then the impact on the WACC would be 1.4%. This illustrates the importance of using assumptions about the risk and cost of equity that are consistent with the level of gearing assumed.
The conclusion of this section is that there are three important issues to consider in deciding whether the Ofwat estimate of the cost of capital is reasonable: the market risk premium, the level of real interest rates, and the use of consistent gearing and beta assumptions. Of these, the most important is the market risk premium, and we now briefly review the debate on this.
The market risk premium
Until relatively recently estimates of the market risk premium were largely based on analysis of historical risk premia. Typical data used for this purpose are shown in Table 4 . Looking first at the arithmetic means (the usual 'averages') we find that the equity market has delivered an annual return in excess of the treasury bill return of 9.2%. The government bond market has delivered a return in excess of the bill return of 1.6% per annum. So the equity premium relative to bond returns has been 7.6%. If the alternative averaging procedure of using geometric means is used, then the equity market risk premium falls by around 2%, depending on whether it is measured relative to bills or bonds. 
More recently there has been a debate about the appropriateness of using the historical arithmetic average premium relative to treasury bills. This debate has several dimensions:
• Should the historical premium be measured relative to bonds rather than bills?
• Should geometric means rather than arithmetic means be used?
• Should the historical averages be adjusted for possible biases?
• Should historical data be abandoned in favour of alternative approaches?
This debate has been conducted in both the US and the UK along similar lines, as both countries have remarkably similar capital market statistics, both in terms of past risk premia and current market yields and interest rates. Indeed, many in the UK mix data from the two markets in their discussion, as if an estimate of the risk premium in one market implies a similar estimate in the other.
The debate in the US has, however, been more transparent. So there are far more published studies relating to the estimation of the US risk premium. Given the similarity of the data in the two markets it is instructive to examine the conclusions reached in the US context to see what lessons they hold for the UK debate.
There are four recent studies that are important in assessing opinion about the US market risk premium: Bruner et al. (1998) survey best practices in estimating the cost of capital. They survey the opinions of leading companies, investment banks and textbooks/tradebooks. Their conclusions on the risk premium are:
'Of the textbooks and tradebooks in our survey, 71% support the use of the arithmetic return over T-bills as the best surrogate for the equity market risk premium……..Half of the financial advisers queried use a premium consistent with the arithmetic mean and T-bill returns, and many specifically mentioned use of the arithmetic mean. Corporate respondents, on the other hand, evidenced more diversity of opinion and tend to favor a lower market premium: 37% use a premium of 5-6% and another 11% use an even lower figure. ….. A glaring result is that few respondents specifically cited use of any forwardlooking method to supplement or replace reading the tea leaves of past returns. ' Cornell et al. (1997) survey the evidence of past returns and also construct a forwardlooking (DCF) estimate of the risk premium. They conclude:
'..after considering all of the data….as well as the DCF estimates for the market, it is concluded that the appropriate premiums are 7.5% over one month bills and 5.5% over 20-year bonds.' Welch (1998) surveys the opinions of professional financial economists on the size of the equity premium. He concludes that:
'…researchers' mean equity premium estimate is about 4.5% on the 1-year horizon, rising to about 6% on the 30-year horizon.' Kaplan and Ruback (1995) estimate the market risk premium implicit in the actual prices of a set of transactions. They conclude that:
'The median implied market equity risk premium was 7.78%, the mean was 7.97%..'
Thus the evidence in the US suggests that, despite some claims to the contrary, the overwhelming practice is to use estimates of the market risk premium that are either consistent with or slightly below the arithmetic mean historical risk premium. This preference for the arithmetic mean rather than the geometric mean stems from the fact that the arithmetic mean is the technically correct measure to use in conjunction with the CAPM (for a discussion see Cooper (1996) ).
Furthermore, there seems to be a preference for using estimates based upon analysis of historical data rather than trusting forward-looking estimates. An insight into why this is the case can be obtained from Myers and Borucki (1994) . They look at two forward-looking approaches: the dividend growth model (DGM) and the discounted cash flow approach (DCF). Both techniques estimate the required return on equity by forecasting future dividends and then calculating the discount rate that will make the present value of the dividends equal to the current share price. The DGM assumes a constant dividend growth rate, whereas the DCF approach allows the future growth of dividends to vary.
The point of the Myers and Borucki study is to check whether something like the DGM gives sensible estimates of the cost of capital for US utilities. They summarise their main conclusions as follows:
'The (constant growth rate) .. formula is attractive because it looks simple. However, that simplicity comes at the expense of an extremely strong assumption, namely that dividends per share are expected to grow at a constant rate forever. Significant errors occur when that assumption is violated.
Variable growth DCF models, which distinguish between short term and long term growth, are more plausible and seem to give cost of capital estimates that are less sensitive to changes in sample or specification. However, even these models rely on strong simplifying assumptions.'
Thus they do not find that either approach gives good estimates of the cost of equity, but they particularly dismiss the constant growth approach.
Another type of forward-looking approach is the survey. It might seem that this is the most direct way to assess the expectations of market participants concerning the equity market risk premium. Unfortunately, such surveys usually have severe problems in interpreting the data. These include:
-Are the expectations arithmetic or geometric averages? Questions phrased in terms of growth rates might be expected to elicit geometric expectations, which are not correct for cost of capital estimates.
-What horizon does the expectation refer to? Expectations about short-term market movements should not be used to set the long-term cost of capital.
-How should the answers be averaged? The average should reflect more heavily those investors with the most influence in setting expected returns. These might, for instance, be the investors with the highest expectations.
The importance of these issues can be seen by the fact that even the very carefully conducted survey of Welch (1998) is ambiguous about whether the respondents gave their arithmetic or their geometric expectations. Since this makes a large difference to the estimate (typically as much as 2%), this is a very serious deficiency.
In summary, many of the issues in estimating the market risk premium are the same in the US and the UK. The historical capital market data are remarkably similar and the current states of the two capital markets are very similar. In the US, however, the debate on these issues is at a more advanced stage than in the UK and has been tested extensively in court. From the evidence, the most common practice in the US is to use estimates of the market risk premium that are consistent with the arithmetic average of past returns. If these are augmented with forward looking measures it is with great caution because of the problem of obtaining reliable forward-looking measures.
This use of risk premium estimates based on averages of historical data persists in the US despite the various arguments for a much lower premium that have been put forward. These include 'the equity premium puzzle', time-variation in the premium and 'survival bias' (for examples see Mehra and Prescott (1985) , Siegel (1992) , Blanchard (1992) , (1993), Brown, Goetzmann and Ross (1995) ). Other studies have attempted to measure the size of these effects (Goetzmann and Jorion (1996) , Pástor and Stambaugh (1998) ) and find that the adjustments to the estimate of the long-run risk premium are either small or depend on the prior beliefs that one brings to the problem. So the adjustment to historical average premia that can be justified by these arguments are not large, unless one simply starts from a position that would imply a particular level of the premium.
By contrast, the similar line of argument that has been developed in the UK (Scott (1992) , Jenkinson (1993a Jenkinson ( ), (1993b ) does seem to have had a much greater effect on UK regulators. This is illustrated most graphically in the recent MMC ruling on Cellnet and Vodaphone. This relies, in its discussion of the equity risk premium, almost entirely on the work of Jenkinson (1998a) and (1998b). In particular, Table 4 on page 396 of the MMC report on Cellnet and Vodaphone is taken, with minor typographical errors, from Jenkinson (1998a) . And the arguments concerning the level of the equity market risk premium, its relationship with the interest rate, and the correct procedure for calculating forward-looking costs of equity are all very similar to those given in Jenkinson (1998a).
This heavy reliance on a single source of analysis is dangerous in any circumstances.
In this case we believe that the analysis given in Jenkinson is wrong, so the procedure is particularly dangerous. We believe that the size of the error in the Jenkinson analysis is about two percent. So the impact of relying in this way on a particular line of argument that has not been subjected to the standard tests of detailed scrutiny could be huge.
The error in the Jenkinson analysis is simple. Jenkinson (1998a) claims that he has a procedure that 'avoids the issue' of geometric versus arithmetic returns. This is as follows. Given the regulatory interest in a five year horizon, the past data are split into non-overlapping five year periods. The returns to stocks, bonds and bills are then computed for each of these periods. For each period the geometric mean return is calculated, which represents the average return that an investor would have earned for each year of the five-year periods. These geometric returns are then averaged across all the five-year periods in the sample. The resulting average is then intended to represent the average five-year experience of an investor. This can then be used as the basis of the five-year future expected return.
The equity return numbers used in the procedure are shown in Table 5 . The first column shows the non-overlapping five-year periods with the last one ending in 1996, the last year of the data that Jenkinson uses. The second column shows the return to the equity market over the whole of each five-year period. The last column shows the annual geometric mean return for each five-year period. The last row shows the average of these, which is 8.5%. This is the statistic that Jenkinson wants to use as the correct estimate of the average historical return over five year periods.
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The logic of the argument is that this statistic represents the average of historical experience over representative five-year periods. So, the argument goes, we require minimal assumptions to adopt this as our expectation of what will happen over the next five year period, the one relevant to current regulation. We will then take 8.5%, or a risk premium based on it, and compound it for five years. This will give the total return required over the next five years. This number should then correspond to the average of the experience of five-year periods in the past. Making this calculation gives a total expected return over five years of (1.085) 5 , which is equal to +50%. So this is what the procedure would give as the expected total return over the next five years.
Given the logic of the argument, we can check that the procedure is working by directly examining total returns over five year periods. The assumptions that underlie the procedure imply that the average of these past total returns is what we can expect in total over the next five-year period. So we simply compute the average of the total returns over past five-year periods. This is shown at the bottom of the second column of Table 5 . It is +65%, implying that the average of past experience for a five-year period is a total return of this amount. So our expected total return over the next fiveyear period should be +65%. But this is higher by fifteen percent than the forecast of +50% given by the Jenkinson procedure. The Jenkinson procedure should, if it is correct, deliver +65% back to us as the expected return over five years. Something has clearly gone wrong. The problem is one that is familiar to all students of the geometric/arithmetic mean debate. It is analysed in detail in Cooper (1996) . The transformation from a five-year total return to a geometric mean is a non-linear transformation. Averages of non-linear functions are not the same as non-linear functions of averages. In this context, the arithmetic average of geometric means is not the same as the geometric average of arithmetic means. It is the latter that is the correct statistic here. Rather than being 8.5% it is 10.5%. The difference of two percent per annum is similar to the familiar difference between the arithmetic and geometric mean of one-year returns.
So Jenkinson has not found a procedure that is immune to the arithmetic versus geometric mean debate. Rather he has provided a nice illustration of the traps one can fall into in this area. This would not be of great interest had not the MMC apparently chosen to base its estimate of one of the most crucial numbers in the whole of UK regulation on his analysis, and his alone. We find this both extraordinary and deeply concerning.
The evidence in the Ofwat review

Introduction
An uninformed reader of the section of the Ofwat consultation paper on the cost of capital might conclude that there remains little left to debate about the cost of equity capital for the UK water industry. On the crucial question of the equity risk premium, the paper states:
'There is, however, broad agreement that the wide range of historical estimates of the premium are of questionable relevance and all significantly overstate the current expectations of actual equity investors.' (page 100)
The evidence adduced to support this view is:
'the Credit Lyonnais Securities Europe (CLSE) survey, which revealed that investors, on average, believe that the cost of capital for the water industry is 7.9% (nominal). After allowing for inflation of between 2.5% and 3.3% …. this would imply an equity risk premium in the range of 2.4% to 4.7%.' 'Certain academic studies which use a partially forward-looking approach (estimating expectations about future returns on bonds) find premia of about 3.5%.'
The conclusion is reached that the regulator will not adopt 'the more aggressive views on the equity risk premium expressed by some analysts and commentators-as low as 1% to 2%' but that 'a more appropriate range for the risk premium is 2.75% to 3.75%.' This is contrasted with the fact that 'Water companies have argued for higher premia in the range 3.5% to 9.03%'.
This discussion might suggest the conclusions that:
• A reasonable range for the risk premium is 1% to 4.7% (the highest and lowest numbers mentioned in the evidence referred to by the regulator).
• The estimate of 2.75% to 3.75% is generous, falling at the upper end of this range.
• The estimates used by the water companies are, on average, higher than any reasonable estimate of the risk premium.
None of these conclusions is consistent with our view. To illustrate why, we will examine the one piece of evidence for which the regulator gives an attribution and for which the evidence is publicly available: the CLSE survey. We will set aside the general methodological misgivings about the use of such surveys that we have discussed above and take the results of the survey at face value. Our point will be that there are several possible interpretations of the data, some of which give estimates of the risk premium that are considerably higher than that used by the regulator.
The CLSE survey
The CLSE survey result used by the regulator is 'that the cost of capital for the water industry is 7.9% (nominal)'. One might, therefore, conclude that the respondents to this survey had been asked to give their estimates of the cost of capital of the water industry. This is, however, not the case. What they were asked is their view of the 'expected real dividend growth in the water sector beyond 1999'. From this the estimate of the water sector cost of capital and the equity market risk premium were constructed using particular assumptions about leverage and dividend yields, combined with the DGM model of the cost of equity and assumptions about the respondents' interpretations of the question. These interpretations and assumptions were made by CLSE, but the survey was conducted independently by Dewe Rogerson. It is therefore legitimate in interpreting the survey both to question and vary the assumptions made by CLSE, since the independence of the survey means that CLSE has no special claim to understanding and interpretation of the survey results.
In interpreting the results of the survey to give a cost of capital estimate, CLSE use a water sector yield of 3.9% to 5.1% in conjunction with the average 'anticipated real dividend growth from 2000 onwards' of 3.2% to give a real cost of equity estimate between 7.1% and 8.3%. The estimate is constructed by simply adding the dividend yield to the growth rate. This is then combined with a level of gearing of between 45% and 55% debt to total capital and a real cost of debt of 2.5% to 3% to give a range of estimates of the real cost of capital for the water sector. The level of gearing comes from the survey answers to the question of what is the maximum acceptable level of gearing for these companies. The resulting range for the cost of capital is 4.6% to 5.9%. A summary of the calculations is given in Panel A of Table 6 below. 
The CLSE analysis provides one possible interpretation of the data. There are, however, several others that are equally plausible. It is likely, for instance, that the questions on growth rates elicited responses that are equivalent to geometric mean expectations. If this is the case, then an adjustment should be made to convert to arithmetic expectations (Welch, 1998) , since these are the appropriate measure for the purpose of estimating the cost of capital. The difference between the arithmetic and geometric averages of past risk premia is between 1.7% and 2.5%. In the first two rows of Panel B of the table, we adjust the expectations of equity returns by these amounts. In the third row we show the effect of assuming that the long-run growth rate of 3.2% will be reached only after a period of growth at the current rate of 6.25% mentioned by CLSE. We calculate the cost of equity from a two-stage growth model assuming that the current growth rate fades to 3.2% over the next ten years.
The final row of panel B in Table 6 shows another possible interpretation of the data. The gearing levels in the survey are book values. They are also maximum possible levels, with no indication that the water companies should or will move to these levels. Indeed, there is no argument that says that a company's maximum possible level of gearing is its optimal level. This raises two problems. First, the gearing level used in a cost of capital calculation should be based on market values. Second, it is not clear that the dividend growth forecasts in the survey assume that the water companies will move to these levels of gearing. In the last row of panel B we substitute the current market value gearing level in the cost of capital calculation.
It could be argued that all three of our adjustments to the interpretation of the data are reasonable. In Panel C of Table 6 we present a range for the cost of capital where the low value is the low value given by CLSE. The high value includes adjustments for the arithmetic mean minus the geometric mean, two-stage dividend growth and the current market value gearing level. The range of possible values is now 4.6% to 9.2%. Against this range, the regulator's central estimate of 4.75% or his adopted estimate of 5.25% do not look so generous.
Other arguments for a low premium
We have discussed the CLSE survey in some detail because the data on which the conclusions are based are publicly available. The other evidence used by the regulator is rather more vague. For instance, no background detail is given for the Price Waterhouse survey results referred to in a book, nor is it even clear which country they refer to.
There are, however, two arguments for a low risk premium that are referred to implicitly by the regulator which should be addressed. The first is the argument made by Jenkinson (1993a) and (1993b) that the historical risk premia statistics are distorted by unanticipated losses to gilts. The second is the argument that a limit on the size of the risk premium can be obtained by an argument based on long-run GDP growth.
The Jenkinson argument, to which the regulator alludes, is that the historical risk premium relative to the gilt market up to 1993 is too high because gilt returns had suffered from the ravages of unanticipated high inflation. We do not believe that this argument has force for several reasons. The main one is that the risk premium to which the standard version of the CAPM refers is the premium against bills. The unanticipated inflation argument has much less force for the level of this risk premium as bill returns adjust to expected inflation every time the investment is rolled over. If the bill premium is combined with a real interest rate based on index-linked gilts, then no reference need be made to the nominal gilt market or nominal gilt returns. Even if the nominal gilt market is used, however, it is difficult to sustain the argument that gilt returns have been unanticipatedly low when the recent period of huge gilt returns is included. When this period is included in the data, the risk premium statistics remain at their traditional levels.
The argument based on GDP growth starts from the assumption that long-run dividend growth cannot be greater than long-run GDP growth. It then uses a reasonable longrun GDP growth estimate of about 3% in conjunction with the current market yield to give a DGM estimate of the long-run expected return on the market. The long-run real interest rate is then subtracted to give an estimate of the market risk premium. This is the basis of some very low estimates of the market risk premium. We do not believe that this is a reliable way to construct a market risk premium estimate. There are problems to do with the effect of share repurchases (Lamdin (1998)), there is the problem of adjusting for the difference between arithemetic and geometric expectations (Welch (1998) ), and there is the question of whether a variable growth rate should be used (Myers and Borucki (1994) ).
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Finally, there is a fundamental fallacy in this use of the argument that the long-run growth rate of dividends must equal the long-run GDP growth rate. The argument used to sustain this view is that dividends cannot grow at a rate higher than GDP in the long run or they will consume all GDP. However, what matters in implying a cost of capital from future dividend expectations is the expected level of future dividends. As dividends are a rather small proportion of GDP, the expected level of dividends could double or treble relative to GDP without becoming an overwhelming proportion. This would make a large difference to the implied risk premium and still satisfy the condition that the long-run growth rates of dividends and GDP are the same. To put it another way, the argument based on GDP growth rates makes the very strong assumption that dividends will remain constant at the present proportion of GDP and there is no particular reason to believe that this is true. What is critical for the cost of capital estimate is dividend growth over the next ten years, and this could diverge very considerably from GDP growth over the same period without violating any plausible long run constraints. Thus we see little force in this argument.
The arguments given in the review: conclusions
The arguments given in the Ofwat review appear, at first sight, to be conclusive in favour of a relatively low market risk premium implying a cost of capital in the range 4.6% to 5.9%. There are, however, reasonable interpretations of the evidence that make the upper end of the range equal to 9.2%. The range considered plausible by the regulator appears to us to be at the low end of the possible range and to imply an inappropriate degree of certainty about the confidence that the cost of capital is at that level. On this question of confidence about the cost of capital, it is interesting to recall the views of Fama and Fench (1997) . They estimate the costs of capital for industries in the US using both the CAPM and an arbitrage pricing theory (APT) model. They conclude:
'Estimates of the cost of equity for industries are imprecise. Standard errors of more than 3.0% per year are typical for both the CAPM and the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) . These large standard errors are the result of (i) uncertainty about true factor risk premiums (the market risk premium) and (ii) imprecise estimates of the loadings of industries on the risk factors (beta). Estimates of the cost of equity for firms and projects are surely even less precise.
' (Phrases in italics added by us.)
The implication is that one should be wary of cost of capital estimates that claim to be very precise.
The UK regulatory debate on the cost of capital: an overall perspective
We can view the Ofwat estimate of the cost of capital in the context of the overall UK regulatory debate by comparing UK regulators' estimates of the one parameter that should be common between them: the market risk premium. Table 7 summarises the explicit estimates of the market risk premium given by UK regulators. There are several features of the data:
• Prior to the MMC Gas ruling estimates were used that are consistent with the arithmetic average of past returns
• After the MMC Gas ruling all UK regulators other than Oftel have used risk premia that are much lower than the arithmetic average of past premia
• After the MMC Gas ruling all regulators apart from Oftel fell into line behind the MMC
• Oftel has consistently used a higher estimate
• The Ofwat estimate is well below current MMC estimates
The central role of the MMC Gas ruling is clear from Table 7 . This ruling was based on rather superficial analysis including a 'survey' of a very small number of participants where neither the methodology nor the detailed results were disclosed. Other regulatory pronouncements since have often been based similarly on the private analysis of private data, a methodology that has obvious deficiencies. To put these estimates in context, the actual risk premium in the five years since the MMC Gas ruling has been about ten percent both relative to T-bills and relative to the five year real gilt rate at the beginning of the period. 3 It is clear that the regulators' forecasts were significantly lower than actual risk premia during this period.
It is often hard, however, to understand UK regulatory pronouncements on the cost of capital as unadulterated attempts to estimate the cost of capital in its pure form. The rate is used in a variety of ways, many of which do not correspond to its intended use. For instance, in BT it has been used in conjunction with historic cost accounts and in the MMC 1993 ruling on British Gas it was used in conjunction with an ad hoc 'depreciation adjustment' that some analysts estimate added 2% to the true rate of return. Similarly the MMC has recently justified the use of interest rates that deviate from current market rates as the basis of the cost of equity by the analysis:
'Focusing too narrowly on the current spot rate runs the risk of setting an inappropriate cost of capital if, as history suggests is likely, real interest rates rise from their current level.'
If it is so obvious that real interest rates can be expected to rise one would, of course, see it reflected in current long-term market rates. That is why standard cost of capital analysis always uses current market rates. The unsatisfactory innovation of the MMC was to incorporate their own speculative view of the future course of UK interest rates into UK regulatory policy. This does not correspond to standard best practice in the estimation and use of the cost of capital.
This use of interest rates that deviate from current market rates does have an important implication for interpretation of the MMC's market risk premium estimate. The headline estimate is 3.5%-5.0%. But this is used in conjunction with a real risk-free rate that is about 1.5% above current levels. It gives rise to a cost of equity for the market that is equivalent to a risk premium of 5.0%-6.5% relative to current interest rate levels. So it is difficult to interpret the risk premium estimate as anything other than part of an overall package, from which one is not free to select any individual item and mix it with other assumptions. The problem with this approach is that, even if the end result in terms of allowed returns turns out to be appropriate overall, the logic underlying the regulatory decision is obscured and subject to misunderstanding. And a particular danger is if the downward biased estimate of the cost of capital is combined with tough efficiency and other regulatory assumptions, resulting in an unduly low overall return.
Unsatisfactory though it is, it may be necessary to view the estimates of the cost of capital by regulators as a vehicle whereby a particular regulatory outcome is sought rather than as an end in itself. The general theory of regulation would suggest that the cost of capital is one of many inputs to a complicated game between the regulator and the regulated. The desired outcome is not necessarily an unbiased estimate of the cost of capital, but rather a complicated combination of expected profits, risk-sharing, efficiency, capital expenditure, and competition (Laffont and Tirole, (1993) ).
Viewed in this way, it becomes easier to understand why regulators have often used very low estimates of the WACC. They may have taken the view that there was considerable 'slack' in the regulated companies and that they had no direct mechanism to eliminate all of the slack. They may have considered that their informational disadvantage, especially in the early stages of the UK regulatory regime, meant that regulated companies would be able to induce them to accept capex and cost forecasts that left room for predictable improvement. In that case allowing the true WACC as the forecast rate of return would have meant that the actual expected return would have been higher. So allowing a WACC that is somewhat below the true WACC may have been a way of offsetting this perceived informational disadvantage. The fact that ex post returns on utilities have turned out to be higher than was predicted in many cases may reinforce this view.
There is evidence in favour of this view in that Oftel, which faces a different problem to some of the other regulators, takes a more lenient line on the cost of capital. The problem faced by Oftel is, at least partially, to set prices that are high enough to encourage competitive entry. The low rates of return allowed by some regulators would probably not do this, so Oftel is forced to deviate from the herd to achieve its particular regulatory objectives.
However, although this general approach of setting a low cost of capital may have worked in earlier price reviews, it carries appreciable dangers looking forward, and particularly for the current regulatory round. Four things have changed since the earlier stages of regulation:
• The level of asymmetric information has decreased considerably. Regulators now have much better ability to deal directly with the costs and capital expenditure forecasts of the regulated companies.
• There is the possibility, discussed in the White Paper on regulation, of other mechanisms for dealing with the asymmetric information problem, including the use of ex-post penalties (error correction mechanisms) for deviations from plans. If one believed that the WACC estimates before were appropriate to the situation of asymmetric information with no correction mechanism, then they must be too low if the potential for gains relative to forecast costs and capex is eliminated.
• It is arguable that much of the operating slack with which companies were privatised has been eliminated. The scope for exceeding operating targets has been greatly reduced.
• Mechanisms have been put in place to generate competition. These rely upon encouraging competitive entry (though this is likely to less prevalent in the water sector compared with other regulated utility sectors)..
This perspective is given support by the CLSE survey that concludes that now 'very few regard the water companies as much less efficient than other companies'. Indeed, the survey gives very strong evidence that investors do not believe that the water activities will be allowed to earn a fair rate of return on incremental investment. Only 8% of investors think that a rights issue 'would be acceptable to fund investment in the core water business or a large capex programme', while a staggering 92% of respondents would not support such a raising of external equity.
The risk of the water industry
Measurement of risk
Apart from the market risk premium, the other important input to the cost of equity is a measure of the risk of the equity. The standard measure of risk for use in cost of capital estimation is the beta of the firm's shares or the beta of its assets. Beta measures that part of an asset's risk that cannot be eliminated by diversification in a portfolio.
A standard authoritative source of UK beta estimates is the London Business School Risk Measurement Service (LBSRMS). Table 8 shows the estimated betas of the large water companies as estimated in the most recent issue of the LBSRMS. Although these betas should be ungeared to give a more precise comparison, the estimates and their pattern over time are similar. So adjusting for individual leverage differences is unlikely to change the basic pattern. What is striking about the beta estimates for water companies presented in Table 8 is the fall in the betas since August 1998. This is the effect of the recent period of turmoil in capital markets. During that time the periodic dramatic falls in the level of the UK stock market were not matched by falls in the price of water shares. The inclusion of this data in the period used for beta estimation lowers the estimate of water companies' betas.
The same effect can be seen in Table 9 , which shows the FTSE water industry beta from the LBSRMS for the last five years. The average estimate over this period is 0.93. It is possible to argue that the recent period of turmoil is atypical and should not be given high weight in the estimation of beta. Such an argument would mean that the estimated water industry beta could be higher than the 0.72 estimated including the data for the most recent period. While this argument is probably correct, there is no simple way of adjusting the beta to take account of it. The adjustment depends on an assumption of how likely such a period is to be repeated in the future, and this is very difficult to estimate from the data.
As an alternative to using estimates of beta based on monthly data, estimates based on daily data could be used. The benefit to be gained from daily data, if they satisfy the statistical assumptions necessary for beta estimation, is that the standard error of the estimate is reduced for estimates over the same period of time, or a shorter period of data can be used to generate estimates with approximately the same standard error. Table 10 shows annual estimates using daily data for total returns on the water industry index and the FTA-All Share Index. These are highly variable, and it is, therefore, apparent that some of the conditions for this type of estimation to give a reliable estimate of beta must be being violated. From inspection, what is happening is that some years have more large daily moves than others and these large moves have a disproportionate effect on the beta estimation. So the assumptions of stability that underlie regression analysis appears to be being violated.
This violation is apparent in the very low estimate for the last year. This clearly does not represent the same type of behaviour as previous years. So any forecast of the future beta for the water industry must answer the question of whether this recent behaviour is more likely to be repeated in the future than the previous behaviour with much higher betas. The upshot of the analysis of the estimates of beta is that the estimates vary a lot over time, in ways that are inconsistent with the assumptions of standard regression analysis. So any estimate of the beta of the water sector must rely partially on fundamental arguments about whether it is intrinsically low or high risk. It is to these arguments that we now turn.
Sources of risk
The type of risk that is important in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is risk that cannot be diversified away by investors holding broadly diversified portfolios. In the CAPM this means, essentially, risk that is related to the overall health of the economy. This risk is measured in the CAPM by beta, a relative measure of the degree of risk in a share that is generated by general economic events (systematic or market risk).
It is probable that the notion of systematic risk that is included in the CAPM is too restrictive. There is strong evidence that the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) gives a more complete description of risk and return than does the CAPM. In the APT there can be more than one source of systematic risk. So, for instance, interest rate risk may be another source of risk, or 'factor', that influences expected returns and the cost of capital. This has been estimated by Elton, Gruber and Mei (1994) as being a major source of risk for US electricity utilities.
It is sometimes argued that regulatory risk must be diversifiable by nature and, therefore, not affect beta and the cost of capital. There are at least two major problems with this view:
• Even if the CAPM is right and the only source of risk is the beta with respect to the general level of the market, regulatory risk may well be closely related to the level of the market. For instance, consider the part of regulatory risk that comes from expectations about how leniently or strictly future governments will treat regulated industries. We will show below that this is potentially a major component of risk. This component of risk will be related to the probability of success for different political parties at future elections. This probability is closely linked to the state of the economy. So regulatory risk coming from this source could have a large component that is related to the health of the general economy. As another example, suppose that governments will use tough regulation to court popularity with the electorate when their fortunes are low because of poor economic news. This again will generate systematic regulatory beta risk.
• In addition to the systematic regulatory risk that is related to the general economy there may well be other systematic sources of regulatory risk that are related to other APT factors. For instance, regulators often do not appear to set returns correctly relative to interest rates. This error is a source of risk that will be related to the level of interest rates. As such it is almost certainly a source of risk that affects required returns in the APT and should be included in any assessment of the cost of capital.
The impact of future regulator discretion on risk can be seen by breaking down the value of a company into two parts: For a company subject to UK-style regulation, one relevant horizon date is the end of the current regulatory period. Beyond this point, the regulator has little ability to bind his successor. Another horizon that is important is the end of the current parliament. Beyond this point, the current government has, similarly, little power to bind its successor. In this respect, UK regulation is very different to US-style regulation, where the detail of the regulation is enshrined in case law. In both cases (regulator and political discretion) the relevant horizon is between one and five years, depending upon where we are in the regulatory cycle and the election cycle.
The proportion of the value of a company that occurs before a particular horizon date can be approximately judged by using the dividend growth model (DGM). Although this model has many major shortcomings, it gives an appropriate indication of the relative values of the cash flows before and after the horizon. To do this, one needs an estimate of the difference between the cost of capital (the discount rate) and the growth rate of the operating cash flows of the firm. A typical number might be around six percent, with lower estimates consistent with lower costs of capital. Table 11 shows the proportion of the value of a firm that occurs before different horizon dates. For instance, if we are at the beginning of the regulatory cycle, so that the horizon is five years, then approximately one quarter of the value of the firm is contributed by cash flows that will occur before the five year period is up. (This assumes a difference between the discount rate and the growth rate of about 6%). If we are halfway through the regulatory period, then the appropriate horizon is two to three years, and the relevant percentage of value is less than fifteen percent.
So by far the majority of value is contributed by cash flows that occur beyond the end of the current period or the end of the current parliament. As a consequence, one must be careful not to base analysis of the risk of a regulated entity only on the treatment of the cash flows in the current regulatory period. Such analysis will be correct only if the treatment in the current period can be expected to continue for a long period into the future. If this is not the case, then the analysis of risk will depend heavily on expectations about future regulation. An interesting perspective on the perceived size of the risk of the horizon value is given in the CLSE survey. First it suggests that:
'The risk profile of the water sector is now regarded by most respondents (68%) as higher or the same (relative to the UK equity market) as was the case at the 1994 periodic review.'
It goes on to say that:
'regulatory risk provides a significant disincentive to holding equity in water companies.'
Second, the majority of investors surveyed agreed that:
'the regulator systematically helps customers at the expense of water companies'
This last is particularly important. There is a certain amount of risk to be borne in any industry, some of which is beta risk. Regulatory systems cannot eliminate risk, they can only reallocate it. The US system puts a large amount of risk on customers by guaranteeing rates of return to investors. Investors in the UK appear to believe that they will bear almost all of the risk, which means that the beta of the horizon value could be quite large.
To push the analysis further, we can use the equation above to break down the sources of risk:
We can further split the horizon value into a part that comes from uncertainty about future cash flows and a part that comes from uncertainty about future discount rates: Combining these expressions for sources of risk, we get:
where:
PVOCF is the present value of operating flows that occur before the horizon date ECFBH is the expected cash flow beyond the horizon date PVHV is the present value of the horizon value DRHD is the discount rate at the horizon date
The above expression applies to any measure of risk, whether it is beta, APT factor risk, or total risk. Its importance here is that we can put some approximate numbers on components of the expression. For instance, the analysis above suggests that the proportion of value that is contributed by the cash flows before the horizon date is less than twenty percent. The empirical results of Campbell and Mei (1993) suggest that the proportion of risk that is attributable to cash flow variability rather than variability of discount rates is less than fifty percent.
These numbers suggest two conclusions:
• If changes in regulation affect risk, then they will have a big effect only if it comes through the portion of the value that is beyond the current regulatory period
• There is always a large component of beta risk that comes from uncertainty about future discount rates, over which regulators have little control
The second of these may well be why even US utilities, whose returns are almost guaranteed, still have significant betas.
Asymmetric Treatment of Risk
Some of the proposals for regulatory reform have a common feature in that they apparently have the effect of reducing returns that are high without commensurately subsidising returns that are low. For instance, proposals to claw back 'excessive' returns through so-called "error correction mechanisms" have this effect. This has several impacts that are important in the cost of capital and its application.
The most important effect is that eliminating the outcomes where high returns are earned lowers the expected return. As an example, suppose that the return that could be earned in a year is given by the numbers in Table 12 . In Case I the expected return is 0%. In Case II, the high return is deemed 'excessive' and clawed back. So, when the return in Case I is +20%, the return in Case II is 0%. The expected return is now minus 5%.
If the regulator were to set the expected return equal to a fair cost of capital without taking into account this effect of possible future clawback on the average return, then the actual return would fall short of a fair return by an average of 5%. This effect on expected returns is likely to be by far the most important effect of clawback provisions.
In principle, the correct way to deal with this problem is to adjust the expected cash flows by the impact of the asymmetric clawback provision. In practice it is unlikely to be easy to make the necessary adjustment in this way as it would involve estimating the probabilities of events about which, by their nature, the regulator must be uncertain. In reality, therefore, the adjustment is likely to take place by an ad hoc adjustment to the cost of capital that evolves over time with experience. The key thing to note, however, is that the size of this adjustment is potentially large if the clawback provision is draconian. There is also an impact of the clawback provision on the cost of capital. Such provisions eliminate part of the risk that is borne by the shareholders of the regulated company. Even thought this risk is all on the upside, once the correct adjustment is made for the effect on the expected return, the resulting capped asset will have a lower beta than the uncapped asset. This effect could be quantified using option theory, but a quite detailed specification of how the cap will operate would be necessary to make the calculation.
Comparison of estimates with the MMC procedure
In this final substantive section, we compare the estimates of the water industry cost of capital given by the 'conventional' procedure and by Ofwat with one based on the MMC procedure given in the MMC report on Cellnet and Vodaphone. For reasons given above we believe that the analysis on which this procedure is based is flawed. In particular, the data on which it bases its risk premium are biased downwards by about 2%. But, given the importance of the MMC in UK regulation it is important to know how various estimates of the cost of capital relate to its preferred procedure.
To implement the MMC procedure we follow as closely as possible their calculation of the cost of capital for Cellnet and Vodaphone. The inputs we use are given in Table  13 . The beta is the average of the LBSRMS betas for the water industry for the last five years. To match the beta estimate the proportion of debt is the average of the market value gearing over the same period (source: Datastream). The inflation forecast is 2.3%, the five-year inflation forecast in the London Business School/ Oxford Economic Forecasting Economic Outlook (1999). The riskless real rate is 3.5%-3.8%, as assumed by the MMC to be consistent with their risk premium. The debt spread is from Ofwat (1998). The estimate of the market risk premium is 3.5%-5.0%. 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Calculations:
Cost of equity = (2.3% + 3.65%) + 0.93 x 4.25% = 9.9%
After-tax cost of debt = (2.3% + 3.65% + 1.25%) x (1-0.3) = 5.0%
Nominal WACC = 0.25 x 5.0% + 0.75 x 9.9% = 8.7%
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The resulting nominal estimate of the after-tax cost of capital is 8.7%.
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It is difficult to compare the detail of the MMC procedure with the inputs used for other estimates because it does not use current interest rates as opportunity rates and it makes an offsetting adjustment to the market risk premium. So the only comparison we can reasonably make is between the final cost of capital figures from various methods. Adjusting the nominal cost of capital from the MMC procedure for the inflation forecast gives a real cost of capital of 6.3%. This compares with the estimates of 6.6% given by the 'conventional' procedure and 4.75%-5.25% from Ofwat.
Conclusions
The estimation of the cost of capital is central to the accepted methodology of regulating private monopoly suppliers of utility services. It is one that has received a great deal of attention, both informed and uninformed, as earlier sections have illustrated. Any estimate is, of course, subject to uncertainty and the precise estimate is one on which reasonable people can reasonably disagree. However, our concern with the current stage of the current periodic review of the UK water sector is that the estimate that seems to be favoured by Ofwat as a result of its consideration of the evidence appears to be very much at the bottom of any reasonable range. We note, in particular, that it is lower than indicated by a straightforward application of the MMC procedure, which itself suffers from certain downward biases.
There are a number of possible reasons for this. But one key contributory factor may well be the reluctance of UK regulatory agencies to recognise the importance of regulatory risk, not so much that risk arising from current regulatory decisions as from the inability of regulatory agencies to enter into binding commitments beyond the current periodic review. Since, as we have shown, most corporate value at risk lies beyond the current periodic review, this is a significant weakness of the current regulatory regime.
In the period soon after privatisation, the regulatory risks were in the opposite direction. There was a widespread failure to understand the extent of inefficiencies in the utility sectors in public ownership, and a corresponding failure to appreciate the scope for subsequent productivity gains. An underestimate of the cost of capital merely offset this other underestimation, rather than cutting into the appropriate rate of return in the sector. But it is important to appreciate that circumstances have changed.
Regulators have caught up with, if not overtaken, the scope for efficiency gains looking forward. The danger is that the past rate of productivity gain, based on the once-for-all efficiency gains from eliminating the inefficiencies of public ownership, will not be achievable in the future. If so, the prospect is that a high target rate of productivity growth set by the regulator will prove unachievable, and depress profits. This is a risk not just for the UK water sector, but relevant for other regulated sectors. By itself, this will weaken the sector in the longer run. Combined with an underestimate of the cost of capital, the consequences could well be very severe indeed.
If our view of the cost of capital appropriate for the water sector is right, and we argue that the strong balance of available public evidence lies in this direction, then the consequence of the Ofwat underestimate is potentially severely detrimental for the future of the UK water sector. A squeeze in profitability risks a degradation of the quality of service delivery, a failure of investment with consequences for future supply quality and reliability, and the absence of competitive entry in those areas of the business where competition is feasible. If sustained over the five year periodic review, then this could severely the long run efficiency of the sector. A key aim of privatisation was to alleviate the dearth of finance for new investment that the publicly owned utilities experienced within the constraints of the public sector. It will be a deep irony if the industry is restored to its former condition by the way in which the privatised sector is regulated a decade later.
